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Abstract
Support for many R&D and technology policies relies on empirical ev-
idence that R&D "spills over" between firms. But there are two counter-
vailing R&D spillovers: positive eﬀects from technology spillovers and neg-
ative eﬀects from business stealing by product market rivals. We develop a
general framework showing that technology and product market spillovers
have testable implications for a range of performance indicators, and exploit
these using distinct measures of a firm’s position in technology space and
product market space. We show using panel data on U.S. firms between
1981 and 2001 that both technology and product market spillovers operate,
but that net social returns are several times larger than private returns.
The spillover eﬀects are also revealed when we analyze three high-tech sec-
tors in detail - pharmaceuticals, computer hardware and telecommunication
equipment. Using the model we evaluate three R&D subsidy policies and
show that the typical focus of support for small and medium firms may be
misplaced.
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1. Introduction
Knowledge spillovers have been a major topic of economic research over the last
thirty years. Theoretical studies have explored the impact of research and develop-
ment (R&D) on strategic interaction among firms and long run growth1, and while
many empirical studies appear to support the presence of technological spillovers,
there remains a major problem at the heart of the literature. This arises from the
fact that R&D generates at least two distinct types of "spillover" eﬀects. The first
is technology (or knowledge) spillovers which increase the productivity of other
firms that operate in similar technology areas, and the second type of spillover is
the product market rivalry eﬀect of R&D. Whereas technology spillover are ben-
eficial to firms, R&D by product market rivals has a negative eﬀect. Despite a
large amount of theoretical research on product market rivalry eﬀects of R&D
(including patent race models), there has been very little empirical work on such
eﬀects, in large part because it is diﬃcult to distinguish the two types of spillovers
using existing empirical strategies.
It is important to identify the empirical impact of these two types of spillovers.
Econometric estimates of technology spillovers in the literature may be severely
contaminated by product market rivalry eﬀects, and it is diﬃcult to ascertain the
direction and magnitude of potential biases without building a model that incor-
porates both types of spillovers. Furthermore, even if there is no such bias, we need
estimates of the impact of product market rivalry in order to asses whether there
is over- or under-investment in R&D. If product market rivalry eﬀects dominate
technology spillovers, the conventional wisdom that there is under-investment in
R&D could be overturned.
This paper develops a methodology to identify the separate eﬀects of technol-
1See, for example, Romer (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Spence (1984), and Reinganum
(1989); and Griliches (1992) and Keller (2004) for surveys of the literature.
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ogy and product market spillovers and implements this methodology on a large
panel of U.S. companies. Our approach is based on two features. First, using a
general analytical framework we develop the implications of technology and prod-
uct market spillovers for a range of firm performance indicators (market value,
patents, productivity and R&D). The predictions diﬀer across performance indica-
tors, thus providing identification for the technology and product market spillover
eﬀects. Second, we empirically distinguish a firm’s positions in technology space
and product market space using information on the distribution of its patenting
(across technological fields) and its sales activity (across diﬀerent four digit in-
dustries). This allows us to construct distinct measures of the distance between
firms in the technology and product market dimensions2. The significant variation
in these two dimensions allows us to distinguish between technology and rivalry
spillovers3.
Applying this approach to a panel of U.S. firms for a twenty year period (1981-
2001) we find that both technological and product market spillovers are present
and quantitatively important, but the social returns from R&D are still positive
and the former dominates the latter. To a first approximation the social returns to
R&D are about 3.5 times the private returns. We also find that R&D by product
market rivals is a strategic complement for a firm’s own R&D. Using parameter
estimates from the model we evaluate the aggregate productivity eﬀects of three
diﬀerent R&D subsidy policies and show that the typical focus of R&D support
2In an earlier study Jaﬀe (1988) assigned firms to technology and product market space,
but did not examine the distance between firms in both spaces. In a related paper, Bransetter
and Sakakibara (2002) make an important contribution by empirically examining the eﬀects of
technology closeness and product market overlap on patenting in Japanese research consortia.
3Examples of well-known companies in our sample that illustrate this variation include IBM,
Apple, Motorola and Intel, who are all close in technology space (revealed by their patenting and
confirmed by their research joint ventures), but only IBM and Apple compete in the PC market
and only Intel and Motorola compete in the semi-conductor market, with little product market
competition between the two pairs. Appendix C has more details on this and other examples.
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for medium and small firms may be misplaced.
Our paper has its antecedents in the empirical literature on knowledge spillovers.
The dominant approach has been to construct a measure of outside R&D (the
"spillover pool") and include this as an extra term in addition to own ‘inside’ R&D
in a production, cost or innovation function. The simplest version is to measure
the spillover pool as the stock of knowledge generated by other firms in the indus-
try (e.g. Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989). This assumes that firms only benefit from
R&D by other firms in their industry, and that all such firms are weighted equally
in the construction of the spillover pool. Unfortunately, This makes identifica-
tion of the strategic rivalry eﬀect of R&D from technological spillovers impossible
because industry R&D reflects both influences4. A more sophisticated approach
recognizes that a firm is more likely to benefit from the R&D of other firms that are
‘close’ to it, and models the spillover pool available to firm i as Gi = Σj,j 6=iwijGj
where wij is some ‘knowledge-weighting matrix’ applied to the R&D stocks (Gj)
of other firms j. All such approaches impose the assumption that the interaction
between firms i and j is proportional to the weights (distance measure) wij, and
there are many approaches to constructing the knowledge-weighting matrix. Best
practice is probably the method first used by Jaﬀe (1986), exploiting firm-level
data on patenting (or R&D spending) in diﬀerent technology classes to locate
firms in a multi-dimensional technology space. A weighting matrix is constructed
using the uncentered correlation coeﬃcients between the location vectors of dif-
ferent firms. We follow this idea but extend it to the product market dimension
by using line of business data from multiproduct firms to construct an analogous
distance measure in product market space5.
4The same is true for papers that use "distance to the frontier" as a proxy for the potential
size of the technological spillover. In these models the frontier is the same for all firms in a given
industry (e.g. Acemoglu, Aghion and Ziblotti, 2003).
5Without this additional variation between firms within industries, the degree of product
market closeness is not identified from industry dummies in the cross section.
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Two caveats are in order about the scope of this paper. First, we focus on
technology and product market spillovers, rather than "rent spillovers" that arise
from mismeasured input prices6. Second, even in the absence of rent spillovers and
strategic eﬀects, it is not easy to distinguish a spillovers interpretation from the
possibility that positive interactions are “just a reflection of spatially correlated
technological opportunities” (Griliches, 1998). If new research opportunities arise
exogenously in a given technological area, then all firms in that area will do more
R&D and may improve their productivity, an eﬀect which may be erroneously
picked up by a spillover measure. This issue is an example of the "reflection prob-
lem" discussed by Manski (1991). A necessary condition for identification is prior
information that specifies the relevant reference group and this is the role played
by a knowledge weighting matrix. Beyond that, we place parametric structure on
the nature of interactions through our firm specific pairings in technology space
and product market space to achieve identification. In addition, we attempt to
mitigate the reflection problem by exploiting the panel structure of our data us-
ing lagged variables and controls for the unobserved shocks (such as firm specific
eﬀects and measures of industry demand).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our analytical framework.
Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 discusses the main econometric issues.
The econometric findings are presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we use the
preferred estimates to evaluate the social returns generated by three R&D subsidy
policies. The concluding remarks summarize the key results and directions for
future research.
6As Griliches (1979) points out, rent spillovers occur when R&D-intensive inputs are pur-
chased from other firms at less than their full ‘quality-adjusted’ price. Such spillovers are simply
consequences of conventional measurement problems and essentially mis-attribute the produc-
tivity gains to firms that purchase the quality-improved inputs rather than to the firms that
produce them.
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2. Analytical Framework
We consider the empirical implications of a non-tournament model of R&D with
technological spillovers and strategic interaction in the product market7. In Ap-
pendix A we analyze a tournament model of R&D with an identical product
market structure to the one analyzed here, and find the qualitative predictions
are similar.
We study a two-stage game. In stage 1 firms decide their R&D spending and
this produces knowledge (patents) that are taken as pre-determined in the second
stage. There may be technology spillovers in this first stage. In stage 2, firms
compete in some variable, x, conditional on knowledge levels k. We do not restrict
the form of this competition except to assume Nash equilibrium. What matters
for the analysis is whether there is strategic substitution or complementarity in
the product market. Even in the absence of technology spillovers, product market
interaction would create an indirect link between the R&D decisions of firms
through the anticipated impact of R&D induced innovation on product market
competition in the second stage.
There are three firms, labelled 0, τ and m. Firms 0 and τ interact only in
technology space (production of innovations, stage 1) but not in the product
market (stage 2); firms 0 and m compete only in the product market.
Stage 2
Firm 00s profit function is π(x0, xm, k0). We assume that the function π is
common to all firms. Innovation output k0 may have a direct eﬀect on profits, as
well as an indirect (strategic) eﬀect working through x. For example, if k0 increases
7This approach has some similarities to Jones and Williams (1998) who examine an endo-
geneos growth model with business stealing, knowledge spillovers and congestion externalities.
Their focus, however, is on the biases of an aggregate regression of productivity on R&D as a
measure of technological spillovers. Our method, by contrast, seeks to inform micro estimates
through separately identifying the business stealing eﬀect of R&D from technological spillovers.
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the demand for firm 0 (e.g. product innovation), its profits would increase for any
given level of price or output in the second stage.8
The best response for firms 0 and m are given by x∗0 = argmax π(x0, xm, k0)
and x∗m = argmax π(xm, x0, km), respectively. Solving for second stage Nash
decisions yields x∗0 = f(k0, km) and x
∗
m = f(km, k0). First stage profit for firm
0 is Π(k0, km) = π(k0, x∗0, x
∗
m), and similarly for firm m. If there is no strategic
interaction in the product market, π(k0, x∗0, x
∗
m) does not vary with xm and thus
Π0 do not depend on km.
We assume that Π(k0, km) is increasing in k0, decreasing in km and concave9.
Stage 1
Firm 0 produces innovations with its own R&D, possibly benefitting from
spillovers from firms that it is close to in technology space: k0 = φ(r0, rτ) where we
assume that the knowledge production function φ is non-decreasing and concave
in both arguments. This means that if there are knowledge spillovers, they are
necessarily positive. We assume that the function φ is common to all firms.
Firm 0 solves the following problem:
max
r0
V 0 = Π(φ(r0, rτ ), km)− r0. (2.1)
Note that km does not involve r0.The first order condition is:
Π1φ1 − 1 = 0
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the diﬀerent argu-
8We assume that innovation by firm m aﬀects firm 00s profits only through xm, which is
plausible in most contexts.
9The assumption that Π(k0, km) declines in km is reasonable unless innovation creates a
strong externality through a market expansion eﬀect. Certainly at km ' 0 this derivative must
be negative, as monopoly is more profitable than duopoly.
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ments.10 By comparative statics,
∂r∗0
∂rτ
= −{Π1φ1τ +Π11φ1φτ}
A
(2.2)
where A = Π11φ1+Π1φ11 < 0 by the second order conditions. If φ1τ > 0, firm 0
0s
R&D is positively related to the R&D done by firms in the same technology space,
as long as diminishing returns in knowledge production are not "too strong." On
the other hand, if φ1τ = 0 or diminishing returns in knowledge production are
strong (i.e. Π1φ1τ < −Π11φ1φτ) then R&D is negatively related to the R&D done
by firms in the same technology space. Consequently the marginal eﬀect of ∂r
∗
0
∂rτ
is
formally ambiguous.
Comparative statics also yield
∂r∗0
∂rm
= −Π12φ1
A
(2.3)
Thus firm 00s R&D is an increasing (respectively decreasing) function of the R&D
done by firms in the same product market if Π12 > 0 — i.e., if k0 and km are
strategic complements (respectively substitutes).11
We also get obtain12
∂k0
∂rτ
= φ2 > 0 and
∂k0
∂rm
= 0 (2.4)
10If we allowed for firms in τ and m to overlap, there would be an additional term reflecting
the fact that the R&D spillover to firm τ also aﬀects km and thus has a negative strategic eﬀect
on its own profits.
11It is worth noting that most models of patent races embed the assumption of strategic
complementarity because the outcome of the race depends on the gap in R&D spending by
competing firms. This observation applies both to single race models (e.g., Loury, 1979; Lee and
Wilde, 1980; Reinganum, 1982) and more recent models of sequential races (Aghion, Harris and
Vickers, 1997; and Aghion et al, 2005). There are patent race models where this is not the case,
but they involve a "discouragement eﬀect" whereby a follower may give up if the R&D gap gets
so wide that it does not pay to invest to catch up.
12One qualification should be noted. Strictly speaking, the result ∂k0∂rm = 0 holds if k measures
the stock of knowledge. But in practice we will measure k by using patenting information. If
the patenting decision is based on the potential market value of the innovation,then we would
expect ∂k0∂rm < 0, because the firm will choose to patent fewer inventions.
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We summarize these results in Table 1
[Table 1 about here]
Two points about identification from the table should be noted. First, the em-
pirical identification of strategic complementarity or substitution comes only from
the R&D equation. Identification cannot be obtained from the patents (knowl-
edge) or value equations because the predictions are the same for both forms of
strategic rivalry. Second, the presence of spillovers can in principle be identi-
fied from the R&D, patents and value equations. Using multiple outcomes thus
provides a stronger test than we would have from any single indicator.
3. Data
We use firm level accounting data (sales, employment, capital, etc.) and market
value data from U.S. Compustat 1980-2001 and match this into the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Oﬃce data from the NBER data archive. This contains detailed
information on almost 3 million U.S. patents granted between January 1963 and
December 1999 and all citations made to these patents between 1975 and 1999
(over 16 million)13. Since our method requires information on patenting, we kept
all firm years with a positive patent stock (so firms which had no patents at all in
the 36 year period were dropped), leaving an unbalanced panel of 736 firms with
at least four observations between 1980 and 2001. Appendix B provides details
on all datasets.
3.1. Calculating Product Market Closeness
Our measure of product market closeness uses Compustat data on the sales and
4-digit SIC codes of the major line of business by firm from 1993 onwards. On
13See Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001).We also constructed a cite weighted firm patent count
as a quality adjusted measure of the raw patent count.
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average each firm reports 4.7 diﬀerent lines of business covering 5.4 diﬀerent 4-
digit SIC codes, spanning 597 industries across the sample. We use average share
of sales per SIC code within each firm over the period as our measure of activity
by product market, Si = (Si,1, Si,2, ...Si,597), where Si,j is the share of sales of
firm i in the 4-digit SIC code j.14 The product market closeness measure, SICi,j
(i 6= j), is then calculated as the uncentered correlation between all firms pairings
following Jaﬀe (1986):
SICi,j =
(SiS
0
j)
(SiS
0
i)
1
2 (SjS
0
j)
1
2
This ranges between zero and one, depending on the degree of product market
overlap, and is symmetric to firm ordering so that SICi,j = SICj,i. We construct
the pool of product-market R&D for firm i in year t, SPILLSICit,as:
SPILLSICit = Σj,j 6=iSICijGjt (3.1)
where Gjt is the stock of R&D by firm j in year t.
3.2. Patent Data and Technological Closeness
The technology market information is provided by the allocation of all patents by
the USPTO into 426 diﬀerent technology classes (labelled N-Classes). We use the
average share of patents per firm in each technology class over the period 1970
to 1999 as our measure of activity by technology market, Ti = (Ti,1, Ti,2, ...Ti,426),
where Ti,j is the share of patents of firm i in technology class j. The techno-
logical closeness measure, TECHi,j (i 6= j), is also calculated as the uncentered
14The breakdown by SIC code was unavailable prior to 1993, so we pool data 1993-2001. This
is a shorter period than for the patent data, but we perform several experiments with diﬀerent
timings of the patent technology distance measure to demonstrate robustness to the exact timing
(see below).
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correlation between all firms pairings:
TECHi,j =
(TiT
0
j )
(TiT
0
i )
1
2 (TjT
0
j)
1
2
This ranges between zero and one, depending on the degree of technology market
overlap15 We construct the pool of technological spillover R&D for firm i in year
t, SPILLTECHit,as
SPILLTECHit = Σj,j 6=iTECHijGjt. (3.2)
Table 2 provides some basic descriptive statistics for the accounting and patenting
data, and the technology and product market closeness measures, TECH and
SIC. The sample firms are large (mean employment is about 18,000), but with
heterogeneity in size, R&D intensity, patenting activity and market valuation.
The two closeness measures also diﬀer widely across firms16.
[Table 2 about here]
3.3. Identification of Product Market versus Technology Distance
In order to distinguish between the eﬀects of technology spillovers and product
market interactions we need variation in the distance metrics in technology and
product market space. To gauge this we do three things. First, we calculate
the raw correlation between the measures SIC and TECH, which is 0.47, sug-
gesting these do reflect some diﬀerential characteristics of firms. After weight-
ing with R&D stocks following equations (3.2) and (3.1) the correlation between
15We pooled across the entire sample period and also experiemented with sub-samples. Using
a pre-sample period (e.g. 1970-1980) reduces the risk of endogeneity, but increases the measure-
ment error due to timing mismatch if firms exogenously switch technology areas. Using a period
more closely matched to the data has the opposite problem (i.e. greater risk of endogeneity
bias). In the event, the results were reasonably similar and (since firms only shift technology
area slowly). The larger sample enabled us to pin down the firm’s position more accurately.
16The absolute level of these measures will, of course, depend on the degree of aggregation of
the underlying patent and product market classes.
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SPILLTECH and SPILLSIC is 0.42, and for estimation with fixed eﬀects the
relevant correlation in the change of SPILLTECH and SPILLSIC is only 0.17.
Second we plot SIC against TEC in Figure 1 from which it is apparent that the
positive correlation we observe is caused by a dispersion across the unit box rather
than a few outliers. Finally, in Appendix C we discuss examples of well-known
firms that are close in technology but distant in product market spaces, and close
in product market but distant in technology space.
4. Econometrics
4.1. Generic Issues
There are three main equations of interest that we wish to estimate: a market
value equation, an R&D equation, and a patents equation17. There are generic
econometric issues with all three equations which we discuss first before turning
to specific problems with each equation. We are interested in investigating the
relationship
yit = x0itβ + uit (4.1)
where the outcome variable for firm i at time t is yit, the variables of interest
(especially SPILLTECH and SPILLSIC) are xit and the error term, whose
properties we will discuss in detail, is uit.
First, we have the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. We will present esti-
mates with and without controlling for correlated fixed eﬀects (through including
a full set of firm specific dummy variables). The time dimension of the company
panel is relatively long, so the "within groups bias" on weakly endogenous vari-
ables (see Nickell, 1981) is likely to be small, subject to the caveats we discuss
17For an example of this multiple equation approach to identify the determination of techno-
logical change, see Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1991).
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below.18 Second, we have the issue of the endogeneity due to transitory shocks.
To mitigate these we condition on a full set of time dummies and a distributed
lag of industry sales19. Furthermore we lag all the other variables on the right
hand side of equation (4.1) by one period to overcome any immediate feedback
eﬀects20. Third, the model in (4.1) is static, so we experiment with more dynamic
forms. In particular we present specifications including a lagged dependent vari-
able. Finally, there are inherent non-linearities in the models we are estimating
(such as the patent equation) which we discuss next.
4.2. Market Value equation
We adopt a simple linearization of the value function proposed by Griliches (1981)21
ln
µ
V
A
¶
it
= lnκit + ln
µ
1 + γv
µ
G
A
¶
it
¶
(4.2)
where V is the market value of the firm, A is the stock of tangible assets, G is
the stock of R&D, and the superscript v indicates that the parameter is for the
market value equation. The deviation of V/A (also known as "Tobin’s average
Q") from unity depends on the ratio of the R&D stock to the tangible capital
stock (G/A) and κit. We parameterize this as
lnκit =βv1 lnSPILLTECHit + β
v
2 lnSPILLSICit + Z
v0
it β
v
3 + η
v
i + τ
v
t + υ
v
it
18We have between 4 and 21 years of continuous firm observations in our sample. In the R&D
equation, for example, the mean number of observations is 18.
19The industry sales variable is constructed in the same way as the SPILLSIC variable. We
use the same distance weighting technique, but instead of using other firms’ R&D stocks we
used rivals’ sales. This ensures that the SPILLSIC measure is not simply reflecting demand
shocks at the industry level.
20This is a conservative approach as it is likely to reduce the impact of the variables we are
interested in. An alternative (in the absence of obvious external instruments) to explicitly use
the lags as instruments - we report some experiments using these GMM based approaches in
the results section.
21See also Jaﬀe (1986), Hall et al (2000) or Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004).
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where ηvi is the firm fixed eﬀect, τ
v
t a full set of time dummies, Z
v
it denotes other
control variables such as industry demand, and υvit is an idiosyncratic error term.
If γv(G/A) was "small" then we could approximate ln
¡
1 + γv
¡
G
A
¢
it
¢
by γv
¡
G
A
¢
it
.
But this will not be a good approximation for many high tech firms and, in
this case, equation (4.2) should be estimated directly by non-linear least squares
(NLLS). Alternatively one can approximate ln
¡
1 + γv
¡
G
A
¢
it
¢
by a series expan-
sion with higher order terms (denote this by φ(GA)), which is more computationally
convenient when including fixed eﬀects. Empirically, we found that a sixth order
series expansion was satisfactory. Taking into consideration the generic econo-
metric issues over endogeneity discussed above, our basic empirical market value
equation is:
ln
µ
V
A
¶
it
= φ((G/A)it−1) + β
v
1 lnSPILLTECHit−1 + β
v
2 lnSPILLSICit−1
+Zv0it β
v
3 + η
v
i + τ
v
t + υ
v
it (4.3)
4.3. R&D equation
We write the R&D equation as:
lnRit = αr lnRit−1+β
r
1 lnSPILLTECHit−1+β
r
2 lnSPILLSICit−1+Z
r0
itβ
r
3+η
r
i+τ
r
t+υ
r
it
(4.4)
The main issue to note is that the contemporaneous value of SPILLTECH
and SPILLSIC would be particularly diﬃcult to interpret in equation (4.4) due
to the reflection problem (Manski, 1991). A positive correlation could either reflect
strategic complementarity or common unobserved shocks that are not controlled
for by the other variables in equation (4.4). Our (admittedly partial) defence
against this problem are that we lag the independent variables by a year and we
include a variety of controls to account for the other factors driving this correlation
(such as a distributed lag in industry sales).
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4.4. Patent Equation
We use a version of the Negative Binomial model to analyze our patent count
data. Models for count data assume a first moment of the form22
E(Pit|Xit, Pit−1) = exp(x0itβp)
where E(.|.) is the conditional expectations operator and Pit is a (possibly cite
weighted) count of the number of patents. In our analysis we want to allow both
for dynamics and fixed eﬀects, and to do so we use a Multiplicative Feedback
Model (MFM). The conditional expectation of the estimator is:
E(Pit|Xit, Pit−1) = exp{δ1Dit lnPit−1 + δ2Dit + βp1 lnSPILLTECHit−1 +
βp2 lnSPILLSICit−1 + Z
p0
itβ
p
3 + η
p
i + τ
p
t} (4.5)
where Dit is a dummy variable which is unity when Pit−1 > 0 and zero otherwise.
The variance of the Negative Binomial under our specification is:
V (Pit) = exp(x0itβ
p) + α exp(2x0itβ
p)
where the parameter, α, is a measure of "overdispersion", relaxing the Poisson
restriction that the mean equals the variance (α = 0 ).
We introduce firm fixed eﬀects into the count data model using the "mean
scaling" method of Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (1999). This relaxes the
strict exogeneity assumption underlying Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984). Es-
sentially, we exploit the fact that we have a long pre-sample history (of up to 15
years per firm) on patenting behaviour to construct its pre-sample average. This
can then be used as an initial condition to proxy for unobserved heterogeneity if
the first moments of the variables are stationary. Although there will be some
22See Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (1999) and Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) for
discussions of count data models of innovation.
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finite sample bias Monte Carlo evidence shows that this pre-sample mean scaling
estimator performs well compared to alternative econometric estimators for dy-
namic panel data models with weakly endogenous variables (see Blundell, Griﬃth
and Windmeijer (2002)).
4.5. Production Function
Although the production function is implicit in theoretical structure outlined
above it is useful for evaluating the impact of policies on social returns to R&D.
Although we consider more complex forms, the basic production function is of the
R&D augmented Cobb-Douglas form:
lnYit = β
y
1 lnSPILLTECHit−1+β
y
2 lnSPILLSICit−1+Z
y0
it β
y
3+η
y
i+τ
y
t+υ
y
it (4.6)
where Y is real sales. The key variables in Zy0it are the other inputs into the
production function - labour, capital, and the own R&D stock. If we measured
output correctly then the predictions of the marginal eﬀects of SPILLTECH and
SPILLSIC in equation (4.6) would be the same as that in the patent equation
(i.e. βy1 > 0 and β
y
2 = 0). Technology spillovers improve total factor productivity
(TFP), whereas R&D in the product market should have no impact on TFP
(conditional on own R&D and other inputs). In practice, however, we measure
output as "real sales" - firm sales divided by an industry price index. Because we
do not have information on firm-specific prices, this induces measurement error.
If R&D by product market rivals depresses own prices (as we would expect), the
coeﬃcient on SPILLSIC will be negative and the predictions for equation (4.6)
are the same as those of the market value equation. Controlling for industry sales
dynamics (see Klette and Griliches, 1996) and fixed eﬀects should go a long way
towards dealing with the problem of firm-specific prices. In the results section,
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we show that that the negative coeﬃcient on SPILLSIC essentially disappears
when we control for these additional factors.
5. Empirical Results
[Tables 4,5,6 about here]
5.1. Market Value Equation
Table 3 summarizes the results for the market value equation. We present spec-
ifications with and without fixed eﬀects. As noted in Section 4, we use a series
expansion in the own R&D stock to tangible capital stock ratio to capture the
nonlinearity in the value equation because it is easier to incorporate fixed eﬀects in
this specification. The coeﬃcients of the other variables in column (1) were close
to those obtained from nonlinear least squares estimation23. In this specification
without any firm fixed eﬀects, the product market spillover variable, SPILLSIC,
has a positive impact on market value of the firm and SPILLTECH is insignif-
icant. These are both contrary to the predictions of the theory. Finally, we find
that the growth of industry sales aﬀects the firm’s market value (the coeﬃcients
are fairly close to each other but of opposite signs), which probably reflects unob-
served demand factors.
Recall that we include a sixth-order series of the ratio of own-R&D stock to
tangible capital, G/A, in order to capture the nonlinearity in the value equation.
Using the parameter estimates on these G/A terms, we obtain an elasticity of
market value with respect to own R&D of 0.241 (at the mean). A ten percent
23For example, using non-linear least squares (NLLS), the coeﬃcients (standard errors) on
SPILLTECH and SPILLSIC were -0.036 (0.008) and 0.039 (0.004), respectively (compared
to -0.040 (0.012) and 0.038 (0.007) in OLS). Using OLS and just the first order term of G/A,
the coeﬃcient (standard errors) on G/A was 0.284 (0.011), as compared to 0.826 (0.037) under
NLLS. This suggests that a first order approximation is not valid since G/A is not "small" - the
mean is close to 50% (see Table 2).
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increase in the stock of R&D for the firm is associated with an increases in its
market value of about 2.4 percent. Evaluated at the sample means, this implies
that an extra dollar of R&D is worth about $1.18 in market value. This represents
the return net of the cost of the R&D, of course (if the private returns just covered
the cost of the R&D, market value would not increase). This estimate is higher
than the 86 cent figure obtained by Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001) over an
earlier sample period24.
When we allow for fixed eﬀects, the estimated coeﬃcient on SPILLTECH
switches signs and becomes positive and significant as compared to column (1)25.
A ten percent increase in SPILLTECH is associated with a 2.4 percent in-
crease in market value. At sample means, this implies that an extra dollar of
SPILLTECH is associated with an increase in the recipient firm’s market value
by 4.32 cents. That is if another firm with perfect overlap in technology areas
(TEC = 1) raised its R&D by one dollar the firms market value would rise by
4.32 cents. Comparing this figure to the return from own-R&D ($1.18), we con-
clude that the private value of a dollar of technology spillover is only worth (in
terms of market value) about 3.6 percent as much as a dollar of own R&D.
With fixed eﬀects, the estimated coeﬃcient on SPILLSIC is now negative and
significant at the five percent level. Evaluated at the sample means, a ten percent
increase in SPILLSIC generates a 0.67 percent reduction in market value. This
implies that an extra dollar of SPILLSIC is associated with a reduction of a
firm’s market value by 4.36 cents. Interestingly, the negative impact of an extra
dollar of product market rivals’ R&D is very similar in magnitude to the positive
impact of a dollar of technology (R&D) spillovers. Of course, the net eﬀect of
24If we re-estimate over the sample period in Hall et al (2000) we find a similar average private
return to the one they obtain.
25The fixed eﬀects are highly jointly significant, with a p-value < 0.001. The Hausman test
also rejects the null of random eﬀects plus three digit dummies vs. fixed eﬀects (p-value=0.02).
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R&D spending by other firms will depend on the product market and technological
distance between those firms (TECH and SIC). Using our parameter estimates,
we can compute the eﬀect of an exogenous change in R&D for any specific set of
firms (see Section 6).
In short, once we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the specification of the
market value equation, the signs of the two spillover coeﬃcients are consistent with
the prediction from the theory outlined in Section 2. Conditional on technology
spillovers, R&D by a firm’s product market rivals should depress its stock market
value, as investors expect that rivals will capture future market share and/or
depress prices.
It is also worth noting that, if we do not control for the product market rivalry
eﬀect, the estimates of the technology spillover variable is biased toward zero.
Column (3) presents the estimates when SPILLSIC is omitted. The coeﬃcient
on SPILLTECH declines and becomes statistically insignificant at the 5 per
cent level. Failing to control for product market rivalry could lead us to miss the
impact of technology spillovers on market value. The same bias is illustrated for
SPILLSIC - if we failed to control for technological spillovers we would find no
statistically significant impact of product market rivalry (column (4)). It is only
by allowing for both "spillovers" simultaneously that we are able to identify their
individual impacts.
Attenuation bias is exacerbated by fixed eﬀects, but classical measurement
error should bias the coeﬃcients towards zero. This suggests that the change in
the coeﬃcients on the spillover variables between columns (1) and (2) when we
introduce fixed eﬀects is not due to classical measurement error as the coeﬃcients
become larger in absolute magnitude. Instead, it is likely that unobserved hetero-
geneity obscures the true impact of the spillover variables on market value. This
could arise if we have not controlled suﬃciently for firms who are closely clustered
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in high tech sectors - they will tend to have high value of SPILLSIC and high
Tobin’s Q (since R&D will not perfectly control for intangible knowledge stocks).
This will drive a positive correlation between the SPILLSIC term and market
value even in the absence of any technological or product market interactions.
Fixed eﬀects control for these correlated eﬀects26.
5.2. Patents Equation
We turn next to the patents equation (Table 4). Column (1) presents the estimates
in a static model with no controls for correlated individual eﬀects. Unsurprisingly,
larger firms and those with larger R&D stocks are much more likely to have more
patents27. SPILLTECH has a positive and highly significant association with
patenting, indicating the presence of technological spillovers. By contrast, the
product market rivalry term has a much smaller coeﬃcient and is not significant
at the 5% level. The overdispersion parameter is highly significant here, rejecting
the Poisson model in favour of the Negative Binomial.
In column (2) we control for firm fixed eﬀects using the Blundell et al (1999)
method of conditioning on the pre-sample patent stock (these controls are highly
significant). Compared to column (1), the coeﬃcient on the R&D stock falls but
remains highly significant. A ten percent increase in the stock of own R&D gen-
erates a 2.8 percent increase in patents. The estimated elasticity of 0.28 points to
more sharply diminishing returns than most previous estimates in the literature,
but the earlier studies do not typically control for technology spillovers or the level
26We also tried an alternative specification that introduces current (not lagged) values of
the two spillover measures, and estimate it by instrumental variables using lagged values as
instruments. This produced similar results. For example estimating the fixed eﬀects specification
in column (2) in this manner (using instruments from t−1) yielded a coeﬃcient (standard error)
on SPILLTECH of 0.281 (0.091 ) and on SPILLSIC of -0.075 (0.029 ).
27We also tried weighting the patent counts by future citations, but this made little diﬀerence
to the main results. We do, however, report these in experiments for specific high tech industries
below.
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of sales to capture demand factors. At sample means, our estimate implies that
an increase in own-R&D stock of one dollar would generate 0.007 extra patents
— equivalently, the cost of the marginal patent produced by own R&D is about
$133,000. Turning to our key variables, allowing for fixed eﬀects reduces the coef-
ficient on SPILLTECH, but it remains positive and significant at the 5% level.
Evaluated at the sample means, the estimates for SPILLTECH imply that an
extra dollar of technology spillovers generates 0.00022 extra patents. Comparing
this figure to the figure for own-R&D, we conclude that a dollar of technology
spillovers is only worth 3 percent as much to a firm as a dollar of its own R&D (in
terms of extra patents generated). Note, that our qualitative findings do not de-
pend on the precise distributional assumptions underlying the Negative Binomial
model. Using a GMM estimator that relies only on the first moment condition
leads to similar results28.
Finally, in column (3) we present our preferred specification, which includes
both firm fixed eﬀects and lagged patent counts29. Not surprisingly, we find
strong persistence in patenting (the coeﬃcient on lagged patents is highly signif-
icant). In this model SPILLSIC is insignificant at conventional levels whereas
SPILLTECH retains a large and significant coeﬃcient.
To summarize, patents are a knowledge output and should be aﬀected by
technological spillovers but not strategic rivalry (at least in our simple models).
The empirical results are consistent with these predictions.
28For example, we used the specification model in column (2) but instrumented firm R&D and
firm sales with their own lagged values dated t− 2 to t− 4. SPILLTECH had a positive and
significant coeﬃcient (0.698 with a standard error of 0.333) and SPILLSIC had an insignificant
coeﬃcient (0.023 with a standard error of 0.089).
29The pre-sample estimator assumes we can capture all of the fixed eﬀect bias by the long
pre-sample history of patents (up to 15 years). To check this assumption, we also included the
pre-sample averages of the other independent variables. Since we have a shorter pre-sample
history of these we conditioned on the sample which had at least 10 years of continuous time
series data. Only the pre-sample sales variable was significant at 5% and this did not change
any of the main results.
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5.3. R&D Equation
We now turn to the coeﬃcient estimates for the R&D equation (Table 5). In
the static specification without firm fixed eﬀects (column (1)), we find that both
technology and product market spillovers are present30. The positive coeﬃcient
on SPILLSIC indicates that own and product market rivals’ R&D (knowledge
stocks) are strategic complements. We control for the level of industry sales,
which picks up common demand shocks and is positively associated with company
R&D spending. We also find that the coeﬃcient on lagged firm sales is large
(elasticity of 0.80) and highly significant. When we include firm fixed eﬀects
(column (2)), the coeﬃcient on SPILLSIC declines substantially (to a third
of its earlier value) but remains positive and highly significant, again indicating
strategic complementarity. The coeﬃcient on SPILLTECH also falls sharply and
becomes insignificant. When we include dynamics (lagged R&D) SPILLSIC is
still significant at the 10% level and the implied, long run eﬀect are slightly lower
than the static specification (0.082). Dropping the insignificant SPILLTECH
in column (4) improves the precision on SPILLSIC which is now significant at
conventional levels31.
To summarize, we find evidence that R&D spending by a firm and its product
market rivals are strategic complements, even after we controlling for industry
30The fixed eﬀects are highly significant (p-value under .001). A Hausman Test of random
eﬀects with three digit industry dummies is rejected in favour of fixed eﬀects (p-value=0.022).
31We checked that the results were robust to allowing sales and lagged R&D to be endoge-
nous by re-estimating the R&D equation using the Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM "system"
estimator. The qualitative results were the same. We used lagged instruments dated t-2 to t-8
in the diﬀerenced equation and lagged diﬀerences dated t-1 in the levels equations. In the most
general dynamic specification of column (3) the coeﬃcient (standard error) on SPILLSIC
was 0.096(0.017 ) and the coeﬃcient (standard error) on SPILLTECH was -0.024 (0.020 ).
Since the lagged dependent variable took a coeﬃicent of 0.819(0.032), however, this implies a
larger magnitude of the eﬀect of SPILLSIC on R&D than the main OLS specifications. The
instruments were valid at the 5% level.
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level demand and firm fixed eﬀects32.
5.4. Production Function
Table 6 contains the results from the production function. The OLS results in
column (1) suggest that we cannot reject constant returns to scale in the firm’s
own inputs (the sum of the coeﬃcients on capital, labor and own R&D is 0.995).
The spillover terms are perversely signed however, with a positive and signifi-
cant coeﬃcient on SPILLSIC and a negative sign on the technological spillover
term, SPILLTECH. Including fixed eﬀects in column (2) changes the results -
SPILLTECH is positive and significant and SPILLSIC becomes insignificant -
this is consistent with the simple theory that the marginal eﬀects of spillovers on
TFP should be qualitatively the same as the marginal eﬀects of spillovers on inno-
vative output (as measured by patents). The third column drops the insignificant
SPILLSIC term and is our preferred specification.
One might be concerned that there are heterogeneous technologies across in-
dustries, so we investigated allowing all inputs (labor, capital and R&D) to have
diﬀerent coeﬃcients in each two-digit industry. Even in this demanding specifi-
cation SPILLTECH remained positive and significant at conventional levels33.
We also experimented with using a proxy for value added instead of real sales as
the dependent variable (following the same procedure as Bresnahan et al. (2002)
- see Appendix B for details). This led to a similar pattern of results34.
32There are only two papers that empirically test for patent races, one on pharmaceuticals
and the other on disk drives (Cockburn and Henderson, 1994; Lerner, 1997), and the evidence
is mixed. However, neither of these papers allows for both technology spillovers and product
market rivalry.
33SPILLTECH took a coeﬃcient of 0.089 and a standard error of 0.045 and SPILLSIC
remained insignificant (coeﬃcient of 0.015 and a standard error of 0.123). Including a full set of
two digit industry time trends also lead to the same findings. The coeﬃcient (standard error)
on SPILLTECH was 0.085 (0.047).
34When using value added as the dependent variable the coeﬃcient (standard error) on
SPILLTECH was 0.189(0.053 ) and on SPILLSIC was -0.016(0.012 ). Including materials on
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[Tables 7, 8, 9 about here]
5.5. Implications of the Results
To summarize our main findings concisely, Table 7 compares the predictions from
the model with the empirical results from Tables 3-5. The match between the the-
oretical predictions and the empirical results is quite close. It gives some reason for
optimism that this kind of approach, based on using multiple performance mea-
sures, can help disentangle the role of technology spillovers and product market
rivalry.
The qualitative implications of our simple theory appear to be supported by
the data. But what are their quantitative implications?. We solve the system of
equations in the model (see Appendix D) to calculate the long-run equilibrium
response of R&D, patents, productivity and market value to an exogenous stimulus
to R&D.
We begin with a unit stimulus to the R&D spending of all firms, which we call
"autarky." This stimulus is then "amplified" by the strategic complementarity in
the R&D equation. The magnitude of this amplification depends on how closely
linked the firm is to its product market competitors, i.e. on the size of its average
SIC. This long run response of R&D, for each firm, then contributes to the value
of SPILLTECH and SPILLSIC, which further amplifies the impact of the
stimulus.
Table 8 summarizes the direct (autarky) eﬀect and the amplification eﬀects
of a one percent R&D stimulus to all firms on each of the endogenous variables.
As row 1 shows, strategic complementarity amplifies the original stimulus by 9.8
percent, so that the 1% stimulus generates 1.098% more R&D. The amplification
the right hand side generated a coeﬃcient (standard error) on SPILLTECH of 0.127(0.038 )
and on SPILLSIC of -0.005(0.009 ).
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eﬀects on patents, market value and productivity are all much larger. The ampli-
fication eﬀect for patents is more than twice as large as the autarky eﬀect (0.502
versus 0.231). Since we found that the coeﬃcient on SPILLSIC in the preferred
specification of the patent equation was not significant, the amplification is coming
from technology spillovers and strategic complementarity in R&D. The amplifica-
tion eﬀect on market value is about one-third the direct eﬀect (0.270 versus 0.728).
Finally, the amplification eﬀect of spillovers on productivity is particularly large
- about two and a half times the size of the direct eﬀect.
To a first approximation, this finding for productivity suggests that the social
returns to R&D are about 3.5 times larger than the private returns. Thus when we
allow for both technology spillovers and product market rivalry eﬀects of R&D, we
find that the former strongly dominate the latter. This confirms the conventional
wisdom of under-investment in private R&D, and thus a role for policy support
for R&D.
5.6. Econometric results for three high-tech industries
We have used both cross firm and cross-industry variation (over time) to identify
the technology spillover and product market rivalry eﬀects. An obvious criticism is
that pooling across industries disguises heterogeneity and an interesting extension
of the methodology outlined here is to examine particular industries in much
greater detail. This is diﬃcult to do given the size of our dataset. Nevertheless, it
would be worrying if the basic theory was contradicted in the high-tech sectors,
as this would suggest our results might be due to biases induced by pooling across
heterogenous sectors. To investigate this, we examine in more detail the three most
R&D intensive sectors where we have a reasonable number of firms to estimate our
key equations - Pharmaceuticals, Computer Hardware and Telecommunications
Equipment. The results from these experiments are summarized in Table 9.
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The results from Computer Hardware (Panel A) are qualitatively similar to the
pooled results. Despite being estimated on a much smaller sample, SPILLTECH
has a positive and significant association with market value and SPILLSIC a neg-
ative and significant association. There is also evidence of technology spillovers in
the production function and the patenting equation (especially when we weight by
patent citations35). Consistent with the theory there is no evidence of SPILLSIC
in the patents equation or in the production function. There is some indication
of strategic complementarity in the R&D equation, as the SPILLSIC term is
positive; however it is not statistically significant. The pattern in Pharmaceuti-
cals is similar, with significant technology spillovers and product market rivalry in
the market value equation. Technology spillovers are also found in the production
function and the patents equation when we weight by citations (intellectual prop-
erty is particularly important in this industry36). As in the computer hardware
sector, the spillover terms are all insignificant in the R&D equation. The results
are slightly diﬀerent in the Telecommunications Equipment industry. Although
we do observe significant technology spillover eﬀects in the market value equation,
the production function and cite-weighted patents equations, we do not observe
any evidence of significant product market rivalry (i.e. the SPILLSIC term is
negative but small and insignificant in the value equation)37.
35Weighting made no diﬀerence to the results in the overall sample, but seems to be more
important in these high-tech sectors.
36For example, Austin (1993) found evidence of rivalry eﬀects through the market value impact
of pharmaceutical patenting. See also Klock and Megna (1993) on semi-conductors.
37We also calculated "rates of return to R&D" (own and spillovers) calculated at the industry
specific sample means. The return to a dollar of own R&D was reasonably similar to the
overall sample ($1.18) in Computers ($0.77) and Telecoms ($1.23). It was much higher in
Pharmaceuticals ($3.65) - a result also found in Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004). The return
to a dollar of SPILLTECH is higher in each of the three high-tech industries ($0.247, $0.864
and $0.144 in Pharmaceuticals, Computers and Telecom respectively), as compared to the return
in the sample as a whole ($0.043). The rivalry eﬀect of a dollar of SPILLSIC is stronger in
Pharmaceuticals (-$0.82) and Computers (-$0.236) than in the overall sample (-$0.044). It is
lower in Telecoms (-$0.008).
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Overall, the results from these high-tech sectors indicate that our main results
are present in precisely those R&D intensive industries where we would expect our
theory to have most bite. There are two caveats. First, we do see some hetero-
geneity - although technology spillovers are found in all three sectors, significant
product market rivalry eﬀects of R&D are only evident in two of the three in-
dustries studied. Second, it is diﬃcult to determine whether R&D is a strategic
complement or substitute from these sectors, possibly due to the smaller sample
size. We leave for future research a more detailed analysis of particular industries
using our approach.
[Table 10 about here]
6. Policy Simulations
The model can also be used to evaluate the spillover eﬀects of R&D subsidy
policies. Throughout the policy experiments we consider a binary treatment (a
firm is either eligible or not eligible) and assume that the proportionate increase in
R&D is the same across all the eligible firms. We alter this proportionate increase
so that it sums to the aggregate increase in the baseline case ($870m). This allows
us to compare the cost eﬀectiveness of alternative policies.
Four policy experiments are considered (Panel A, Table 10). For the first
(row 1) each firm is given a one percent stimulus to R&D. Given the average
R&D spending in the sample this “costs” $870 million. Working out the full
amplification eﬀects in the model this generates an extra $95.0 million of R&D
(for a total R&D increase of $965.0 million). This is associated with an extra
$2,717 million in output. The other three experiments consider a stimulus of the
same aggregate size ($870m) but distribute it in diﬀerent ways.
The second experiment (row 2 in Panel A) is calibrated to a stylized version
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of the current U.S. R&D tax credit to determine the eligible group (40% of all
firms in this case)38. This policy generates very similar spillovers for R&D and
productivity as the overall R&D stimulus in row 1. The reason is that the firms
eligible for the tax credit have very similar average linkages in the technology and
product markets as those in the sample as a whole (compare rows 1 and 2 in Panel
B, Table 10).
The third experiment gives an equi-proportionate increase in R&D only to
firms below the median size, as measured by employment averaged over the 1990’s
(about 3,500 employees). The fourth experiment does the same for firms larger
than the median size. Splitting by firm size is interesting because many R&D
subsidy and other technology policies are targeted at SMEs (small and medium
sized enterprise).39 These last two policy simulations show a striking result: the
social returns, in terms of spillovers, of subsidizing "smaller" firms are much lower
than from subsidizing larger firms. The stimulus to larger firms generates $2.8
billion of extra output, as compared to only $1.6 billion when the R&D subsidy
is targeted on "smaller" firms. As Panel B shows, this diﬀerence arises because
large firms are much more closely linked to other firms in technology space and
thus generate (and benefit from) greater technology spillovers. The average value
of TEC for large firms is 0.130 as compared to 0.074 for "smaller" firms40. That
38We keep to a simple structure in order to focus on the main policy features rather than
attempt a detailed evaluation of actual existing tax credit systems (see Bloom et al, 2002 for a
detailed analysis of R&D policies). We treat a firm as eligible in our simulation if it was eligible
to receive any R&D tax credit for a majority of the 1990’s.
39In practice, policies are typically targetted at firms much smaller than the median firm in
our sample. We also tried conducting the experiment for the lowest and highest quartiles of the
size distribution, but there was not enough R&D conducted by the lowest employment quartile
to make the analysis sensible (i.e., the required percentage increase in their R&D was too large
to justify the linear approximation of the model used for the simulations).
40We were concerned that our econometric results may be under-estimating the spillovers
of smaller firms. For example, relative to large firms, smaller companies may be less able to
appropriate the benefits of technology spillovers, and thus be more likely to pass on technology
spillovers to consumers in the form of lower prices. We tested this idea by interacting the size
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is, smaller firms are more likely to operate in technology niches generating lower
average spillovers.
This finding should caution against over-emphasis on small and medium sized
firms by some policy makers. Of course, appropriate policy design would have to
take into account many caveats in terms of the simplicity of the model (e.g. we
have abstracted from credit constraints that might be worse for smaller firms).
7. Conclusions
Firm performance is aﬀected by two countervailing R&D spillovers: positive ef-
fects from technology spillovers and negative "business stealing" eﬀects from R&D
by product market rivals. We develop a general framework showing that tech-
nology and product market spillovers have testable implications for a range of
performance indicators, and then exploit these using distinct measures of a firm’s
position in technology space and product market space. Using panel data on U.S.
firms between 1981 and 2001 we show that both technology and product market
spillovers operate, but social returns still exceed private returns to a large degree.
We also find that R&D by product market rivals is (on average) a strategic comple-
ment for a firm’s own R&D. Using the model we evaluate the net spillovers (social
returns) from three R&D subsidy policies which suggested that R&D policies that
were tilted towards the smaller firms in our sample would be unwise.
There are various extensions to this line of research. First, while we examined
heterogeneity across industries by looking at three high-tech sectors, much more
could be done within our framework using detailed, industry-specific datasets.
Second, it would be useful to develop and estimate more structural, dynamic
models of patent races. Finally, the semi-parametric approach in Pinkse et al
dummy with SPILLTECH in the production function (Table 6, column 2). This interaction
was negative, as expected, but insignificant (coeﬃcient of -0.019 with a standard error of 0.026).
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(2002) could be used to construct alternative spillover measures.
Despite the need for these extensions, we believe that the methodology oﬀered
in this paper oﬀers a fruitful way to analyze the existence of these two distinct
types of R&D spillovers that are much discussed but rarely subjected to rigorous
empirical testing.
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FIGURE 1 – 
 SIC AND TEC CORRELATIONS 
 
Notes: This figure plots the pairwise values of SIC (closeness in product market space between 
two firms) and TEC (closeness in technology space) for all pairs of firms in our sample. 
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TABLE 1 - 
 
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS FOR MARKET VALUE, PATENTS AND R&D 
UNDER DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS OVER TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS AND 
STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY/SUBSTITUTABILITY OF R&D 
 
Comparative 
static 
prediction 
Empirical  
counterpart 
No 
Technological 
Spillovers 
No 
Technological 
Spillovers 
Some 
Technological 
Spillovers 
Some 
Technological 
Spillovers 
 
  Strategic 
complements 
Strategic 
Substitutes 
Strategic 
complements 
Strategic 
Substitutes 
 
∂V0/∂rτ Market value 
with 
SPILLTECH 
 
Zero Zero Positive Positive 
∂V0/∂rm Market value 
with 
SPILLSIC 
 
Negative Negative Negative Negative 
∂k0/∂rτ Patents with 
SPILLTECH 
 
Zero Zero Positive Positive 
∂k0/∂rm Patents with 
SPILLSIC 
 
Zero Zero Zero Zero 
∂r0/∂rτ  R&D with 
SPILLTECH 
 
Zero Zero Ambiguous Ambiguous 
∂r0/∂rm R&D with 
SPILLSIC 
 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
 
 
Notes: See text for full derivation of these comparative static predictions 
 36
TABLE 2 - 
 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
variable Mnemonic Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
 
Tobin’s Q V/A 2.33 1.39 2.96 
Market Value, $m V 3,929 424 15,841 
R&D Stock, $m G 605 28 2,723 
R&D stock/fixed 
capital 
G/A 0.47 0.17 0.94 
R&D flow, $m R 90 3 434 
Technological 
spillovers, $m 
SPILLTECH 21,873 17,390 17,622 
Product market 
rivalry, $m 
SPILLSIC 6,069 1,912 9,498 
Patent flow, # P 16 1 74 
Sales, $m Y 3,133 494 9,741 
Fixed capital, $m A 1,182 103 4,111 
 
     
 
Notes: The means, medians and standard deviations are taken over all non-missing observations 
between 1981 and 2001. $ figures in 1996 values.
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TABLE 3 -  
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR TOBIN’S-Q EQUATION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
Ln (V/A) 
No individual 
Effects 
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
(drop 
SPILLSIC) 
 
Fixed Effects 
(drop 
SPILLTEC) 
Ln(SPILLTECHt-1) -0.040 
(0.012) 
0.240 
(0.104) 
0.186 
(0.100) 
 
Ln(SPILLSICt-1) 0.038 
(0.007) 
-0.067 
(0.031) 
 -0.047 
(0.031) 
Ln(Industry Salest) 0.434 
(0.068) 
0.294 
(0.044) 
0.298 
(0.044) 
0.299 
(0.044) 
Ln(Industry Salest-1) -0.502 
(0.067) 
-0.170 
(0.045) 
-0.176 
(0.045) 
-0.164 
(0.043) 
 
Polynomial terms in lagged (R&D Stock/Capital Stock) 
 
 
Ln(R&D Stock/Capital 
Stock)t -1 
0.898 
(0.154) 
0.801 
(0.197) 
0.792 
(0.198) 
0.800 
(0.199) 
[Ln(R&D Stock/Capital 
Stock)t -1]2 
-0.218 
(0.214) 
-0.385 
(0.222) 
-0.374 
(0.222) 
-0.374 
(0.223) 
[Ln(R&D Stock/Capital 
Stock)t -1]3 
-0.006 
(0.111) 
 0.120 
(0.103) 
0.115 
(0.103) 
0.115 
(0.104) 
[Ln(R&D Stock/Capital 
Stock)t -1]4 
-0.010 
(0.025) 
-0.029 
(0.022) 
-0.020 
(0.022) 
-0.020 
(0.022) 
[Ln(R&D Stock/Capital 
Stock)t -1]5 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002  
(0.002) 
0.002  
(0.002) 
0.002  
(0.002) 
[Ln(R&D Stock/Capital 
Stock)t -1]6 
0.005 a 
(0.009) 
-0.007a 
(0.007) 
-0.006a 
(0.008) 
-0.006 a 
(0.008) 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
No. Observations 10,011 10,011 10,011 10,011 
     
 
a coefficient and standard error have been multiplied by 100 
 
Notes: Tobin’s Q = V/A is defined as the market value of equity plus debt, divided by the stock of 
fixed capital. The equations are estimated by OLS (standard errors in brackets are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedacity and first order serial correlation using the Newey-West correction). A 
dummy variable is included for observations where lagged R&D stock equals zero.  
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TABLE 4 -  
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THE PATENT EQUATION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
Patent Count 
No initial 
conditions: 
Static 
 
Initial 
Conditions: 
Static 
Initial 
Conditions: 
Dynamics 
Initial 
Conditions: 
Dynamics 
Ln(SPILLTECH)t-1 0.403 
(0.086) 
0.295 
(0.066) 
0.192 
(0.037) 
0.194 
(0.037) 
Ln(SPILLSIC)t-1 0.044 
(0.032) 
0.049 
(0.031) 
0.024 
(0.019) 
 
Ln(R&D Stock)t-1 0.495 
(0.044) 
0.282 
(0.046) 
0.105 
(0.027) 
0.104 
(0.027) 
Ln(Sales)t-1 0.338 
(0.052) 
0.258 
(0.047) 
0.138 
(0.027) 
0.140 
(0.027) 
Ln(Patents)t-1   0.550 
(0.026) 
0.550 
(0.026) 
Pre-sample fixed effect  0.450 
(0.049) 
0.175 
(0.028) 
0.174 
(0.028) 
     
Over-dispersion (alpha) 0.954 
(0.067) 
0.814 
(0.046) 
0.402 
(0.029) 
0.402 
(0.029) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
4 digit industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Observations 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -20,559 -20,178 -18,697 -18,699 
     
 
Notes: Estimation is conducted using the Negative Binomial model. Standard errors (in brackets) 
are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. 
A full set of four digit industry dummies are included in all columns. A dummy variable is 
included for observations where lagged R&D stock equals zero (all columns) or where lagged 
patent stock equals zero (columns (3) and (4)). The initial conditions effects in columns (3) and 
(4) are estimated through the “pre-sample mean scaling approach” of Blundell, Griffith and Van 
Reenen (1999) – see text. 
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TABLE 5 –  
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THE R&D EQUATION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
ln(R&D) 
No Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects + 
Dynamics 
Fixed Effects + 
Dynamics 
 
Ln(SPILLTECH) t-1 0.224 
(0.017) 
0.115 
(0.071) 
0.039 
(0.039) 
 
Ln(SPILLSIC) t-1 0.291 
(0.012) 
0.110 
(0.026) 
0.025 
(0.014) 
0.030 
(0.013) 
Ln(Sales) t-1 0.797 
(0.009) 
0.801 
(0.017) 
0.218 
(0.015) 
0.217 
(0.015) 
Ln(R&D) t-1   0.695 
(0.015) 
0.695 
(0.015) 
Ln(Industry Sales) t 0.698 
(0.083) 
0.133 
(0.030) 
0.133 
(0.022) 
0.134 
(0.022) 
Ln(Industry Sales) t-1 -0.879 
(0.083) 
-0.085 
(0.031) 
-0.110 
(0.023) 
-0.108 
(0.022) 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  No Yes Yes Yes 
No. Observations 8565 8565 8395 8395 
R2 0.769 0.968 0.984 0.984 
 
 
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity 
and serial correlation using Newey-West corrected standard errors. The sample includes only 
firms which performed R&D continuously in at least two adjacent years.  
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TABLE 6 –  
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
 Ln(Sales) 
 
No Fixed Effects 
 
Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Ln(SPILLTECH) t-1 -0.038 
(0.009) 
0.104 
(0.046) 
0.111 
(0.045) 
Ln(SPILLSIC) t-1 -0.008 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
 
Ln(Capital) t-1 0.291 
(0.009) 
0.164 
(0.012) 
0.165 
(0.012) 
Ln(Labour) t-1 0.646 
(0.012) 
0.628 
(0.015) 
0.627 
(0.015) 
Ln(R&D Stock) t-1 0.059 
(0.005) 
0.045 
(0.007) 
0.045 
(0.007) 
Ln(Industry Sales) t 0.208 
(0.040) 
0.197 
(0.021) 
0.198 
(0.021) 
Ln(Industry Sales) t-1 -0.105 
(0.040) 
-0.040 
(0.022) 
-0.040 
(0.022) 
    
    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects  No Yes Yes 
No. Observations 10,092 10,092 10,092 
R2 0.945 0.989 0.989 
 
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity 
and allow for first order serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure.  Industry price 
deflators are included and a dummy variable for observations where lagged R&D equals to zero.  
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TABLE 7 –  
COMPARISON OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS TO MODEL WITH TECHNOLOGICAL 
SPILLOVERS AND STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
 
 
 Partial 
correlation of: 
 
Theory Empirics Consistency? 
∂V0/∂rτ Market value 
with 
SPILLTECH 
 
Positive 0.240* Yes 
∂V0/∂rm Market value 
with SPILLSIC 
 
Negative -0.067* Yes 
∂k0/∂rτ Patents with 
SPILLTECH 
 
Positive 0.192* Yes 
∂k0/∂rm Patents with 
SPILLSIC 
 
Zero 0.024 Yes 
∂r0/∂rτ  R&D with 
SPILLTECH 
 
Ambiguous 0.039 - 
∂r0/∂rm R&D with 
SPILLSIC 
Positive 0.025* Yes 
 
Notes: The theoretical predictions are for the case of technological spillovers with product market 
rivalry (strategic complements and non-tournament R&D) - this is the third column of Table 1. 
The empirical results are from the most demanding specifications for each of the dependent 
variables (i.e. dynamic fixed effects for patents and R&D, and fixed effects for market value). A * 
denotes significance at the 10% level (note that coefficients are as they appear in the relevant 
tables, not marginal effects). 
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TABLE 8 – 
 AUTARKY, SPILLOVER AND TOTAL EFFECTS OF AN R&D SHOCK 
 
 
   (1) (2) (3) 
 Variable Amplification Mechanism Autarky Effect Amplification 
Effect  
Total Effect 
(amplification + 
Autarky) 
 
1 R&D  1 
 
0.098 
(0.053) 
1.098 
(0.053) 
2 Patents TECH, SIC and R&D 0.231 
(0.028) 
0.502 
(0.091) 
0.734 
(0.119) 
3 Market Value TECH, SIC and R&D 0.728 
(0.161) 
0.270 
(0.112) 
0.998 
(0.212) 
4 Productivity TECH, SIC and R&D 0.050 
(0.007) 
0.123 
(0.049) 
0.173 
(0.049) 
 
Notes: Calculated in response to a 1% direct stimulus to R&D in all firms – see text. All numbers 
are percentages. Results are calculated using preferred estimation results (i.e. Table 3 column (2), 
Table 4 column (4), Table 5 column (4) Table 6 column (3)). Standard errors in brackets 
calculated using the delta method.   
 
“Autarky effect” (in column (1)) refers to the impact on the outcomes solely from the firm’s 
initial increase in R&D. “Amplification Effects” (in column (2)) reports the additional impact 
from product market and technology space spillovers. “Total effect” (column (3)) reports the total 
effect from summing autarky and spillover effects (i.e. column (1) plus column (2)).  
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TABLE 9 – 
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS FOR SPECIFIC HIGH TECH INDUSTRIES 
 
A. Computer Hardware  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Tobin’s Q Patents Cite-
weighted 
patents 
R&D Real Sales 
Ln(SPILLTECH)t-1 1.302 
(0.622) 
0.151 
(0.090) 
0.338 
(0.146) 
0.263 
(0.199) 
0.685 
(0.213) 
Ln(SPILLSIC)t-1 -0.476 
(0.145) 
-0.005 
(0.153) 
0.157 
(0.342) 
0.039 
(0.026) 
-0.092 
(0.085) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
 0.717 
(0.065) 
0.427 
(0.084) 
0.684 
(0.056) 
 
Observations 358 279 279 390 343 
 
B. Pharmaceuticals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Tobin’s Q Patents Cite-
weighted 
patents 
R&D Real Sales 
Ln(SPILLTECH)t-1 1.628 
(0.674) 
-0.273 
(0.326) 
1.056 
(0.546) 
0.407 
(0.225) 
0.445 
(0.208) 
Ln(SPILLSIC)t-1 -1.342 
(0.612) 
-0.106 
(0.194) 
-0.087 
(0.174) 
-0.395 
(0.452) 
-0.391 
(0.227) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
 0.218 
(0.091) 
0.269 
(0.089) 
0.590 
(0.147) 
 
Observations 334 265 265 381 313 
 
C. Telecommunication Equipment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Tobin’s Q Patents Cite-
weighted 
patents 
R&D Real Sales 
Ln(SPILLTECH)t-1 2.255 
(0.870) 
0.368 
(0.202) 
0.658 
(0.368) 
0.140 
(0.246) 
0.526 
(0.304) 
Ln(SPILLSIC)t-1 -0.087 
(0.446) 
0.036 
(0.110) 
-0.010 
(0.217) 
0.033 
(0.118) 
0.147 
(0.156) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
   0.590 
(0.063) 
 
Observations 405 
 
353 353 429 390 
Notes: Each column corresponds to a separate equation for the industries specified. The 
regression specification is the most general one used in the pooled regressions. Tobin’s Q 
(column 1) corresponds to the specification in column (2) of Table 3; Patents (column 2) 
corresponds to column (3) of Table 4; cite-weighted patents (column 3) is identical to the 
precious column but replaces all patent counts with their forward cite weighted equivalents; R&D 
(column (4)) corresponds to column (3) of Table 5; Sales (column 5) corresponds to column (2) 
of Table 6. Each Panel (A,B,C) are has results from separate industries (see Data Appendix)  
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TABLE 10 – 
 POLICY SIMULATIONS: SPILLOVER IMPACTS ACROSS DIFFERENT GROUPS OF 
FIRMS 
 
Panel A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Target Group Total R&D 
Stimulus, $m 
Total R&D 
Spillovers, $m  
Total Productivity 
Spillovers, $m  
 
1. All Firms 870 95.0 2,717 
2. US R&D Tax Credit (firms 
eligible in median year) 
870 94.9 2,747 
3. Smaller Firms (smallest 50%) 870 91.2 1,581 
4. Larger Firms (largest 50%) 870 95.1 2,767 
 
Panel B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Target Group % firms Average SIC 
 
Average TEC 
1. All Firms 100 0.046 0.127 
2. US R&D Tax Credit (firms 
eligible in median year) 
40 0.052 0.131 
3. Smaller Firms (smallest 50%) 50 0.041 0.074 
4. Larger Firms (largest 50%) 50 0.050 0.130 
 
Notes: All numbers in 1996 prices and simulated across all firms who reported non-zero R&D at 
least once over the 1990-2001 period. In Panel A we consider four different experiments. The 
first row gives every firm 1% extra R&D. Given average R&D spending in the sample this 
“costs” $870m (column (1)). We predict (column (2)) that incorporating dynamics and spillovers 
this will generate an extra $95.0m of R&D (a total $965.0m). This is associated with an extra 
$2,717m increase in production (column 3)). 
 
The other rows consider a stimulus of the same aggregate size ($870m) but distributed in different 
ways (column (1) of Panel B gives the proportion of firms affected). Row 2 is calibrated to a 
stylized version of the current US R&D tax credit (see text for details) to determine the eligible 
group (40% of firms) and assumes all eligible firms increase R&D by the same proportionate 
amount (capping the total at $870m). The final column again shows the impact on R&D and 
productivity. Row 3 considers an experiment that gives an equi-proportionate increase in R&D to 
the smallest 50% of firms (by mean 1990s employment size). Row 4 does the same for the largest 
50% of firms. 
 
In panel B, the SIC and TEC average values have been calculated after weighting by the R&D of 
the spillover receiving firm times the R&D of the spillover generating firm. This accounts for the 
average closeness of difference groups of firms and also the absolute size of the spillovers.  
Appendices
A. Tournament Model of R&D Competition with Techno-
logical Spillovers
In this appendix we analyze a stochastic patent race model with spillovers (see
Section 2 for a non-tournament model). We do not distinguish between competing
firms in the technology and product markets because the distinction does not make
sense in a simple patent race (where the winner alone gets profit). For generality
we assume that n firms compete for the patent.
Stage 2
Firm 0 has profit function π(k0, x0, xm). As before, we allow innovation output
k0 to have a direct eﬀect on profits, as well as an indirect (strategic) eﬀect working
through x. In stage 1, n firms compete in a patent race (i.e. there are n−1 firms in
the set m). If firm 0 wins the patent, k0 = 1, otherwise k0 = 0. The best response
function is given by x∗0 = argmax π(x0, xm, km). Thus second stage profit for firm
0, if it wins the patent race, is π(x∗0, x
∗
m; k0 = 1), otherwise it is π(x
∗
0, x
∗
m; k0 = 0).
We can write the second stage Nash decision for firm 0 as x∗0 = f(k0, km) and
first stage profit as Π(k0, km) = π(k0, x∗0, x
∗
m). If there is no strategic interaction
in the product market, πi does not vary with xj and thus x∗i and Π
i do not
depend directly on kj.Recall that in the context of a patent race, however, only
one firm gets the patent — if kj = 1, then ki = 0. Thus Πi depends indirectly
on kj in this sense. The patent race corresponds to an (extreme) example where
∂Πi(ki, kj)/∂kj < 0.
Stage 1
We consider a symmetric patent race between n firms with a fixed prize (patent
value) F = π0(f(1, 0), f(0, 1); k0 = 1)− π0(f(0, 1), f(1, 0); k0 = 0). The expected
value of firm 1 can be expressed as
V 0(r0, rm) =
h(r0, (n− 1)rm)F − r0
h(r0, (n− 1)rm) + (n− 1)h(rm, (n− 1)rm + r0) +R
(A.1)
where R is the interest rate, rm is the R&D spending of each of firm 00s rivals, and
h(r0, rm) is the probability that firm 0 gets the patent at each point of time given
that it has not done so before (hazard rate). We assume that h(r0, rm) is increasing
and concave in both arguments. It is rising in rm because of spillovers.1 We also
assume that hF − R ≥ 0 (expected benefits per period exceed the opportunity
cost of funds).
The best response is r∗0 = argmax V
0(r0, rm).Using the shorthand h0 =
h(r0, (n − 1)rm) and subscripts on h to denote partial derivatives, the first or-
der condition for firm 0 in the patent race is
(h1F − 1){h0 + (n− 1)hm +R}− (h0F − r1){h01 + (n− 1)hm2 } = 0 (A.2)
Imposing symmetry and using comparative statics, we obtain
sign
µ
∂r0
∂rm
¶
= sign{h12(hF (n− 1) + rF −R}+ {h1(n− 1)(h1F − 1)}
−{h22(n− 1)(hF −R)}− h2{(n− 1)h2F − 1}} (A.3)
We assume h12 ≥ 0 (spillovers do not reduce the marginal product of a firm’s
R&D) and h1F − 1 ≥ 0 (expected net benefit of own R&D is non-negative).
These assumptions imply that the first three bracketed terms are positive. Thus
a suﬃcient condition for strategic complementarity in the R&D game ( ∂r0∂rm > 0)
is that (n−1)h2F −1 ≤ 0. That is, we require that spillovers not be ‘too large’. If
firm 0 increases R&D by one unit, this raises the probability that one of its rivals
wins the patent race by (n− 1)h2. The condition says that the expected gain for
its rivals must be less than the marginal R&D cost to firm 0.
Using the envelope theorem, we get ∂V
0
∂rm
< 0. The intuition is that a rise in rm
increases the probability that firm m wins the patent. While it may also generate
spillovers that raise the win probability for firm 0, we assume that the direct
eﬀect is larger than the spillover eﬀect. For the same reason, ∂V
0
∂km
|k0 = 0. As in
the non-tournament case, ∂r0∂rm > 0 and
∂V 0
∂rm
|r0 < 0. The diﬀerence is that with a
simple patent race, ∂V
0
∂km
|k0 is zero rather than negative because firms only race for
a single patent.2.
1The probability that firm 1 gets the patent might be decreasing in rm in the absence of
spillovers (it is normally assumed to be independent). The spillover term in our formulation can
be thought of as net of any such eﬀect.
2In this analysis we have assumed that k = 0 initially, so ex post the winner has k = 1 and
the losers k = 0. The same qualitiative results hold if we allow for positive initial k.
2
B. Data Appendix
The main firm level data sample is generated through the combination of several
datasets
The Compustat North-America dataset providing full accounts data for
over 25,000 US firms from 1980 to 2001. This provides information on the key
accounting information of R&D, fixed assets, employment, sales, etc.
The Compustat line of business dataset which provides details of sales
broken down by into four digit SIC codes for 10,500 U.S. firms between 1993 and
2001 (checked by Compustat staﬀ for accuracy). Prior to 1993 this information
was not published by Compustat which explains why previous researchers have
not used it (Compustat merely gave a main four digit SIC classification). Some
firms have a further sub-division of their multiple lines of business data into a
"primary" four digit SIC and a "secondary" four digit SIC classification . When
this is the case we assumed that 75% of the sales was in the primary SIC and 25%
in the secondary SIC. The results appear robust to alternative ways of dividing
sales between primary and secondary classifications (for example, assuming that
67% was in the primary and 33% in the secondary SIC).
The NBERUSPTOpatents database described providing detailed patent-
ing and citation information for around 2,500 firms (as described in Hall, Jaﬀe
and Trajtenberg (2001)).
We started by matching the Compustat accounting data to the USPTO data,
and kept only patenting firms leaving a sample size of 1,865. These firms were then
matched into the line of business data, keeping only the 795 firms with data on
both patents and sales by line of business, although these need not be concurrent.
For example, a firm which patented in 1985, 1988 and 1989, had line of business
data from 1993 to 1997, and accounting data from 1980 to 1997 would be kept
in our dataset for the period 1985 to 1997. Finally, this dataset was cleaned
to remove accounting years with extremely large jumps in sales, employment or
capital signalling merger and acquisition activity. When we removed a year we
treat the firm as a new entity and give it a new identifier (and therefore a new
fixed eﬀect) even if the firm identifier (CUSIP reference) in Compustat remained
the same. This is more general than including a full set of firm fixed eﬀects as
we are allowing the fixed eﬀect to change over time in a non-parametric way. We
also removed firms with less than four consecutive years of data. This left a final
estimating sample of 736 firms with accounting data for at least some of the period
1980 to 2001 and patenting data for at least some of the period between 1970 and
1998. The panel is unbalanced as we keep new entrants and exiters in the sample.
The book value of capital is the net stock of property, plant and equipment
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(Compustat Mnemonic PPENT); Employment is the number of employees (EMP).
R&D (XRD) is used to create R&D capital stocks calculated using a perpetual
inventory method with a 15% depreciation rate (Hall et al, 2000). We use sales
as our output measure (SALE). Material inputs were constructed following the
method in Bresnahan et al. (2002). We start with costs of good sold (COGS)
less depreciation (DP) less labor costs (XLR). For firms who do not report labor
expenses expenditures we use average wages and benefits at the four-digit industry
level (Bartelsman, Becker and Gray, 2000, until 1996 and then Census Average
Production Worker Annual Payroll by 4-digit NAICS code) and multiply this
by the firm’s reported employment level. This constructed measure is highly
correlated at the industry level with materials. Obviously there are problems
with this measure of materials (and therefore value added) because we do not
have a firm specific wage bill for most firms which is why we focus on the real
sales (rather than value added) based production functions.
For Tobin’s Q firm value is the sum of the values of common stock, pre-
ferred stock, total debt net of current assets (Mnemonics MKVAF, PSTK, DT
and ACT). Book value of capital includes net plant, property and equipment,
inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and intangibles other than
R&D (Mnemonics PPENT, INVT, IVAEQ, IVAO and INTAN). Tobin’s Q was
set to 0.1 for values below 0.1 and at 20 for values above 20. See also Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2004).
The construction of the spillover variables is described in Section 3 above in
detail. About 80% of the variance of SPILLTECH and SPILLSIC is between firm
and 20% is within firm. When we include fixed eﬀects we are, of course, relying on
the time series variation for identification. Industry sales were constructed from
total sales of the Compustat database by 4-digit SIC code and year, and weighted
up to the firm level in our panel using each firms distribution of sales across 4-digit
SIC codes.
Industry price deflators were taken from (Bartelsman, Becker and Gray, 2000,
until 1996 and then the BEA 4-digit NAICS Shipment Price Deflators afterwards).
In Table 9 the industries we consider are the following. Computer hardware in
Panel (A) covers SIC 3570 to 3577 (Computer and Oﬃce Equipment (3570), Elec-
tronic Computers (3571), Computer Storage Devices (3572), Computer Terminals
(3575), Computer Communications Equipment (3576)and Computer Peripheral
Equipment Not Elsewhere classified (3577). Pharmaceuticals in Panel B includes
Pharmaceutical Preparations (2834) and In Vitro and In Vivo Diagnostic Sub-
stances (2835). Telecommunications Equipment covers Telephone and Telegraph
Apparatus (3661), Radio and TV Broadcasting and Communications Equipment
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(3663) and Communications Equipment not elsewhere classified (3669)
C. Case Studies
There are numerous case studies in the business literature of how firms can be
diﬀerently placed in technology space and product market space. Consider first
firms that are close in technology but sometimes far from each other in product
market space (the bottom right hand quadrant of Figure 1). Table A1 shows IBM,
Apple, Motorola and Intel: four high highly innovative firms in our sample. These
firms are close to each other in technology space as revealed by their patenting.
IBM, for example, has a TECH correlation of 0.8 with Intel, 0.6 with Apple and
0.5 with Motorola (the overall average TECH correlation in the whole sample is
0.13 - see Table 10). The technologies that IBM uses for computer hardware are
closely related to those used by all these other companies. If we examine SIC,
the product market closeness variable, however, there are major diﬀerences. IBM
and Apple are product market rivals with a SIC of 0.32 (the overall average SIC
correlation in the whole sample is 0.05 - see Table 10). They both produce PC
desktops and are competing head to head. Both have presences in other product
markets of course (in particular IBM’s consultancy arm is a major segment of
its business) so the product market correlation is not perfect. By contrast IBM
(and Apple) have a very low SIC correlation with Intel and Motorola (0.01 to
0.02) because the latter firms mainly produce semi-conductor chips not computer
hardware. IBM is not really competing with Intel and Motorola for customers.
The SIC correlation between Intel and Mototrola is, as expected, rather high
(0.35) because they are both competitors in supplying chips.
At the other end of the diagonal (top left hand corner of Figure 1) there
are many firms who are in the same product market but using quite diﬀerent
technologies. One example from our dataset is Gillette and Valance Technologies
who compete in batteries giving them a product market closeness measure of 0.33.
Gillette owns Duracell but does no R&D in this area (its R&D is focused mainly
personal care products such as the Mach 3 razor and Braun electronic products).
Valence Technologies uses a new phosphate technology that is radically improving
the performance of standard Lithium ion battery technologies. As a consequence
the two companies have little overlap in technology space (TECH = 0.01).
A third example is the high end of the hard disk market, which are sold to
computer manufacturers. Most firms base their technology on magnetic technolo-
gies, such as the market leader, Segway. Other firms (such as Phillips) oﬀer hard
disks based on newer, holographic technology. These firms draw their technologies
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from very diﬀerent areas, yet compete in the same product market. R&D done
by Phillips is likely to pose a competitive threat to Segway, but it is unlikely to
generate useful knowledge spillovers for Segway.
D. Policy Experiments
The general specification of the empirical model can be written
lnRit = α1 lnRit−1 + α2 ln
X
j 6=i
TECHijGj,t−1 + α3 ln
X
j 6=i
SICijGj,t−1 + α4X1,it
lnPit = β1 lnPit−1 + β2 lnGit−1 + β3 ln
X
j 6=i
TECHijGj,t−1
+β4 ln
X
j 6=i
SICijGj,t−1 + β5X2it
ln(V/A)it = γ1 ln(G/A)it + γ2 ln
X
j 6=i
TECHijGj,t−1 + γ3 ln
X
j 6=i
SICijGj,t−1 + γ4X3,it
lnYit = ϕ1 lnGit + ϕ2 ln
X
j 6=i
TECHijGj,t−1 + ϕ3 ln
X
j 6=i
SICijGj,t−1 + ϕ4X4,it
where R is the flow of R&D expenditure flow, G is the R&D stock, P is patent
flow, V/A is Tobin’s Q, Y is output and X1, X2, X3 and X4 are vectors of control
variables. We actually use a sixth order series in ln(G/A) but suppress that here
for notational simplicity.
We examine the long run eﬀects in the model, and so set Rit = Rit−1 and
Gj =
Rj
r+δ where r is the discount rate and δ is the depreciation rate used to
construct G. Then the model is
lnRi = α0 +
α2
1− α1
ln
X
j 6=i
TECHijRj +
α3
1− α1
ln
X
j 6=i
SICijRj +
α4
1− α1
X1i
lnPi = β0 +
β2
1− β1
lnRi +
β3
1− β1
ln
X
j 6=i
TECHijRj +
β4
1− β1
ln
X
j 6=i
SICijRj +
β5
1− β1
X2i
ln(V/A)i = γ0 + γ1 ln(R/A)i + γ2 ln
X
j 6=i
TECHijRj + γ3 ln
X
j 6=i
SICijRj + γ4X3i
lnYit = ϕ0 + ϕ1 lnRi + ϕ2 ln
X
j 6=i
TECHijRj,t−1 + ϕ3 ln
X
j 6=i
SICijRj,t−1 + ϕ4X4i
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where α0 = − α2+α3(1−α1) ln(r+δ), β0 = −
β2+β3+β4
(1−β1)
ln(r+δ), γ0 = −(γ1+γ2+γ3) ln(r+
δ), and ϕ0 = −(ϕ1 + ϕ2 + ϕ3) ln(r + δ)
We take a first order expansion of ln [
P
j 6=i TECHijRj] and ln [
P
j 6=i SICijRj]
in order to approximate them in terms of lnR around some point, call it lnR0.
Take first f i = ln [
P
j 6=i TECHijRj] = ln [
P
j 6=i TECHij exp(lnRj)]. Approxi-
mating this nonlinear function of lnR,
f i ' { ln
X
j 6=i
TECHijR0j −
X
j 6=i
(
TECHijR0jP
j 6=i TECHijR
0
j
) lnR0j}+
X
j 6=i
(
TECHijR0jP
j 6=i TECHijR
0
j
) lnRj
≡ ai +
X
j 6=i
bij lnRj
where ai reflects the terms in large curly brackets and bij captures the terms in
parentheses in the last terms.
Now consider the term gi = ln [
P
j 6=i SICijRj].By similar steps we get
gi ' { ln
X
j 6=i
SICijR0j −
X
j 6=i
[
SICijR0jP
j 6=i SICijR
0
j
] lnR0j}+
X
j 6=i
(
SICijR0jP
j 6=i SICijR
0
j
) lnRj
≡ ci +
X
j 6=i
dij lnRj
Define
λi = α0 +
α2
1− α1
ai +
α3
1− α1
ci (D.1)
θij =
α2
1− α1
bij +
α3
1− α1
dij (D.2)
Using these approximations, we can write the R&D equation as
lnRi = λi +
X
j 6=i
θij lnRj +
α4
1− α1
X1i
Let λ, lnR and X1 be Nx1 vectors, and define the NxN matrix
H =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 θ12 θ13 . . θiN
θ21 0 θ23 θ2N
θ31 θ32 0 θ34 . θ3N
. .
. .
θN1 θN2 . . . 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
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Then the R&D equation can be expressed in matrix form
lnR = Ω−1λ+
α4
1− α1
Ω−1X1
=⇒
d lnR = Ω−1
α4
1− α1
dX1
where Ω = I −H.
This enables us to evaluate the firm-level distributional and macro aggregate
impact of introducing shocks to any sub-group of firms.
D.1. Amplification Eﬀects
D.1.1. R&D equation
Using the restrictions
P
j 6=i bij =
P
j 6=i dij = 1, it can be shown that Ω × i =
(1− α2+α3
1−α1 ) ι where ι is a column vector of ones. It follows that the macro R&D
response to a unit stimulus to R&D of each firm ( α4
1−α1dX1 = 1 ) is
Ω−1 × ι = 1− α1
1− α1 − α2 − α3
x ι
In the absence of technology and product market spillovers, R&D would increase
by one percent. Thus we define the amplification eﬀect as 1−α1
1−α1−α2−α3 − 1.
D.1.2. Patents equation
Using the approximations above, the patents equation is (ignoring constants)3
lnPi =
β2
1− β1
lnRi +
X
j 6=i
ρij lnRj +
β5
1− β1
X2i
where ρij =
β3
1−β1
bij +
β4
1−β1
dij. By similar reasoning, we define the NxN matrix
3In this experiment we assume that the only forcing variable is X1. If X2 in the patents
equation is the same as X1 (e.g. industry sales), then we need to add the direct eﬀect of the
change in X1 on patents as well as the induced eﬀect via R&D.
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W =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 ρ12 ρ13 . . ρiN
ρ21 0 θ23 ρ2N
ρ31 ρ32 0 ρ34 . ρ3N
. .
, .
ρN1 ρN2 . . . 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Letting d lnR and d lnP be Nx1 vectors, we get
d lnP =
β2
1− β1
d lnR+ [W × d lnR]
Using the result from the R&D amplification eﬀect d lnR = 1−α1
1−α1−α2−α3 × ι,
we get the macro response of patents to a unit stimulus to R&D of each firm
d lnP =
1− α1
1− α1 − α2 − α3
(
β2
1− β1
× ι× ι0 +W )× ι
=
1− α1
1− α1 − α2 − α3
(
β2 + β3 + β4
1− β1
)× ι
Thus the amplification eﬀect on patents equals 1−α1
1−α1−α2−α3 (
β2+β3+β4
1−β1
)− β2
1−β1
.
D.1.3. Tobin’s-Q and productivity equations
The calculations are completely analogous. For brevity, we do not repeat the
details here.
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
 
TABLE A1 –  
AN EXAMPLE OF SPILLTEC AND SPILLSIC FOR FOUR MAJOR FIRMS 
 
 Correlation IBM Apple Motorola Intel 
IBM SIC 
TECH  
1 
1 
0.32 
0.64 
0.01 
0.47 
0.01 
0.76 
Apple SIC 
TECH 
 1 
1 
0.02 
0.17 
0.01 
0.47 
Motorola SIC 
TECH 
  1 
1 
0.35 
0.46 
Intel SIC 
TECH 
   1 
1 
 
Notes: The cell entries are the values of SICij = (Si S’j)/[(Si Si’)1/2(Sj S’ j)1/2] (in normal script) and 
TECHij = (Ti T’j)/[(Ti Ti’)1/2(Tj T’ j)1/2] (in bold italics) between these pairs of firms. 
 
